# Short-term Changes in the Program
Copy deadline: 2 May 2013, 17.00


Welcome Addresses (Friday, 9.00–9.30, Auditorium)

*Christian Suhm (Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald, Academic Manager)*
*Dirk Jörke (University of Greifswald, Chair in Political Theory and History of Political Ideas, Stand-in Professor)*
*Michael Hein (Organising Committee; University of Greifswald, Chair in Political Theory and History of Political Ideas, Research Associate)*


Panel I-2: Separation of Powers and Constitutional Review
in Contemporary Constitutional Theory (Friday, 14.30–17.30, Auditorium)

Cancelled (15.30):
**The Societal Constitutionalism in the Light of Althusian Societal Federalism**
*Mustafa Yaylali, Dr., Istanbul Sehir University*

Cancelled (17.00):
**Historical/Unwritten Constitution and Judicial Review:**
**Chances and Challenges of a New Constitutional Culture in Hungary**
*Kálmán Pócza, Dr., Pázmány Péter Catholic University (Budapest)*

New presentation (17.00):
**Can Theories in Legal Theory be made practical?**
*Maciej Dybowski, Dr., Adam Mickiewicz University (Poznan)*

The paper discusses the model conditions of applicability of a theory in Legal Theory, and possibly in other social sciences, by developing a three-level approach. The points of departure are syntactic model of a theory which uses the concepts of chain of anaphors and idealization. Secondly a semantic model is discussed and criticized, and thirdly, conditions of „pragmatisation" of a theory are introduced. The three-level model is illustrated by a case of a theory of judicial power.


Panel III-1: Concepts in Political and Legal Theory (Friday, 11.30–16.00, Seminar Room)

Modified title and abstract (15.30):
**Determinacy and Objectivity of Law in Ronald Dworkin's Jurisprudence**
*Filip Gołba, LL.M., Jagiellonian University (Krakow)*

The purpose of this paper is to present some of the discussions over the issues of objectivity and determinacy of law. In particular the problems ensuing from Ronald Dworkin's theory of adjudication are going to be elaborated on. The predominant problem which arises might be formulated as follows: even if it is taken for granted that law, as conceived be legal positivists, is determinate and objective it still remains an unsettled matter whether law as understood by Ronald Dworkin, possess these qualities. Reason why it is so is Dworkin's refusal to concede to the separation of law and morality thesis. As long as one believes the thesis to be correct the purported subjectivity and indeterminacy of morality is irrelevant for theorizing about legal objectivity and determinacy. However, when the thesis is denied, in order to preserve objectivity and determinacy of law one is obliged to prove that morality is determinate and objective. Since the latter claims were widely challenged

within metaethics and since one of the fundamental claims of Dworkin's jurisprudence is the doctrine of "one right answer" he owes us an account of moral objectivity (even the mitigated version of the doctrine proposed in Law's Empire requires it).

Instead of attempting to refute various arguments casted against objectivity of morality Dworkin questions the entire undertaking of metaethics. He distinguishes between "external" and "internal" arguments, accusing the former of being unintelligible. In his view, employing metaphysics to answer ethical questions is an instance of "bad philosophy" and consequently questions usually labelled as metaethical (in particular issues of objectivity and determinacy of morality) are to be answered by substantive moral arguments rather than ontological considerations. As Dworkin's reasoning in this respect does not seem convincing, defence of his theory of law requires engagement in metaethical disputes and refutation of non-cognitivist and error-theoretic positions.


Panel III-2: Legal, Sociological and Political Theory in the History of Ideas
(Friday, 16.30–17.30, Conference Room)

Cancelled (17.00):
**On Paul Ricœur's Political Theory**
*Marcin Pieniążek, PhD, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University (Krakow)*